Introduction
The advent of the new democracy in 1994 resulted in a new lease of life 1 for customary law owing to its constitutional recognition as a legitimate system of law alongside common law. Prior to this period, South African legal history had been characterised by the apartheid system, which institutionalised the discrimination that permeated every sphere of society. As Meierhenrich correctly points out, the law was characterised by a system that:
 demonstrated its ability by serving as an effective method of control;  promised to better the apartheid government's standing in the internal community by providing a modicum of legitimacy; and  embodied a sincere belief in its appropriateness.
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The development of customary law was not immune to this either, as it had fallen prey to a legal system that recognised it only in so far as it could be used to perpetuate the discrimination against the majority of South African citizens. 3 Dlamini similarly indicates that the recognition of customary law was not born of any exceptional insight or sympathy that the apartheid government may have had for
African customary law, but of other more prosaic reasons which were based solely on the need to facilitate more effective control over the African population. See Grant 2006 Journal of African Law 3. He indicates that South Africa is a culturally diverse society in which the culture of the majority, including the legal culture, has, over a long period of time, been disparaged and subjected to a minority "Western" culture, first under colonialism and subsequently under apartheid. 4 Dlamini 1992 Legal Studies Forum 133. See also Mamdani Citizen and Subject 27-29. He demonstrates that the apartheid system established a second-tier legal and administrative order which focused on asserting power and control over the great majority of the South African Moreover, Myers describes this period, which he refers to as "British indirect rule in South Africa", as one that systematically institutionalised "divide and conquer" by using customs, traditions, ethnic identity and legitimisation to impose government authority through indirect rule.
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Pursuant to the adoption of the 1996 Constitution, 6 customary law is given formal recognition and placed on an equal footing with common law. This means that it is recognised as a legitimate system in South Africa's new legal order. The period following 1994 affirms the legitimacy of the various sources of the law which are reinforced by the supremacy of the Constitution 7 and the independence of the judiciary. 8 Basically, the post-1994 period is characterised by a firm recognition of the mixed legal systems which Rautenbach refers to as a "potjiekos". According to her, the system consists of common, civil and customary law layers which lay the foundation for the evolution of the values of the new constitutional dispensation. 9 The importance of the doctrine of "potjiekos" lies in the fact that it affirms that the legitimacy of the law receives its effectiveness from the consent of the people, which was not the case in the past.
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people. In fulfilling its objectives, it needed to establish institutional and political control over traditional authorities by: "developing a system of indirect rule that created a dependent but autonomous state system that combined accountability to superiors with a flexible response to the subject population, a capacity to implement central directives with one to absorb local shocks," quoted in Sibanda "When is the Past not the Past?" 31-32.
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See Review of Myers Indirect Rule in South Africa by Skelcher 2009 H-Net Reviews. See also Bennett Customary Law 157. Bennett notes that while customary law was recognised by the courts, it was not on the same footing, but subservient to common law, and treated as an inferior system of law which became an "invented tradition" of interpretation and application by the courts, quoted in Moyo Relevance of Culture and Religion. 6 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, hereinafter referred to as the Constitution.
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See section 2 which provides that: "This Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic; law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid, and the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled."
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See section 165 which provides that: (1) The judicial authority of the Republic is vested in the courts.
(2) The courts are independent and subject only to the Constitution and the law, which they must apply without fear, favour or prejudice. (3) No person or organ of state may interfere with the functioning of the courts. (4) Organs of state, through legislative and other measures, must assist and protect the courts to ensure the independence. (5) An order or decision issued by a court binds all persons to whom and organs of state to which it applies.
9
Rautenbach 2008 EJCL 13.
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Even though the new constitutional dispensation is highly commended for the changes and transformation it has brought to the development and building of a united South Africa, the aftereffects of the past are still evident even today. For example, it is evident from the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court in the resolution of customary law disputes, where the court imports common law values in addressing customary law issues. This will not be addressed in this paper
In this regard, the purpose of the paper is to provide a critical overview and a comparative analysis of the constitutional protection of customary law in relation to its equal status with common law. The objective is to determine the substantive nature of its constitutional status and its contribution to the general framework of the law in South Africa. This purpose raises a number of questions but those will be limited to determining if the Constitution recognises customary law out of a genuine respect for indigenous cultures?
This argument is limited to section 8(3) of the 1996 Constitution and the jurisprudence that emanates from the Constitutional Court without a focus on the shortcomings of the latter, as that has already been argued elsewhere. 11 The primary focus on section 8(3) and the Constitutional Court is justified by the fact that: It is therefore argued in this paper that the constitutional protection of the customary law system conveys nothing more than the institutionalised dominant status of common law principles over those of customary law. It reduces the significance of customary law rules to a system in which it is a stepchild to common law that has to be "merely tolerated". 12 This is evident from the remedies provided by the everyone has the right to use the language and to participate in the cultural life of their choice, but no one exercising these rights may do so in a manner inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of Rights.
This provision is reinforced by section 31, which also protects the right to culture by providing that:
(1) persons belonging to a cultural, religious or linguistic community may not be denied the right, with other members of that community: (b) to form, join and maintain cultural, religious and linguistic associations and other organs of civil society. (2) the rights in subsection (1) may not be exercised in a manner inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of Rights.
The importance of customary law is further reinforced by section 39(3), which states that:
the Bill of Rights does not deny the existence of any other rights or freedoms that are recognised or conferred by common law or customary law or legislation, to the extent that they are consistent with the Bill. It is deduced from these factors that the recognition of customary law confirms its significance and relevance as the courts seek to integrate it within the general framework of the law in South Africa. 26 They also guarantee the right of everyone to live according to the legal system applicable to the particular cultural group to which they belong, as the specific recognition of customary law rules and principles gives effect to South Africa's diverse population. According to Fishbayn, this also indicates an expression of the desire to recognise the importance of a culturally based community for the wellbeing of individuals and society, and to make a space in which Extracted from Nhlapho "Judicial Function of Traditional Leaders". He points out that the old, unequal relationship between common law as the big brother and customary law as the poor cousin has gone.
Section 8(3) and its potential to limit the development of customary law values
As noted above, the recognition of the historical subjugation of customary law to common law remains uncertain, as it raises more questions than answers. This uncertainty is traced back to the lack of consistency in the protection of customary law rules by the Constitution itself. The Constitution advances the development of common law principles over those of customary law. This is evident in section 8(3) of the Constitution which limits the development of customary law rules and principles by making specific reference to common law to the exclusion of customary law. Despite the envisaged effect of the application of the Bill of Rights, of grave concern is its application to all law to the exclusion of customary law, as entrenched in section 8(3), which states that:
… when applying the provisions of the Bill of Rights to a natural or juristic person in terms of subsection 3, a court: (a) in order to give effect to a right in the Bill, must apply or if necessary develop the common law to the extent that the legislation does not give effect to that rights; and (b) may develop the rules of common law to limit the right, provided that the limitation is in accordance with section 36(1).
37
It may be deduced that this provision institutionalises the dominant status of common law over customary law by failing to make a specific reference to the latter, as is the case with the former system of law. The exclusion of customary law in section 8(3) 34 Section 8(1) of the Constitution. from the development of the law in general raises uncertainty as to its protection in the Constitution. This means that the application and evolution of customary norms and standards for the development of the law in general may be inferred from the concept of "all law". Generally, the concept of "law", without specific reference to either common or customary law, is essential for the regulation of relationships between citizens. However, the creation of the concept of "inference" in section 8(3), which is fused within the concept of "all law", waters down an argument by Kennedy.
She argues that "law" is essential for the regulation of human relations and affirms its importance by noting that: Notwithstanding the significance of the "law" in the regulation of human relations, as
Kennedy indicates, the inference of the absence of customary law from the concept of "all law" reverts to the historical subjugation of its application through the lens of common law, which was rejected by the Constitutional Court in Alexkor v Richtersveld Community. 39 The inference defeats the importance of including customary norms in the Constitution, the purpose of which was explained by Moseneke DCJ in Gumede. He states that the objective of customary law's inclusion was to:
 ensure that customary law, like statutory law or the common law, is brought into harmony with our supreme law and its values;  bring [it] in line with international human rights standards;  salvage and free customary law from its stunted and deprived past; and  lastly, fulfil and reaffirm the historically plural character of our legal system, which now sits under the umbrella of one controlling law -the Constitution. . The Court correctly pointed out that the application of customary law must now be determined by reference to the Constitution and not common law. "Therefore, like any other recognised legal system in South Africa, it is possible to say of customary law that "its force and validity depends on the Constitution" (para 51). the development … will be seen by the public not only as a progressive positive contribution to the advancement of the "undocumented customary law… practices" but also as a development of the common law and its jurisprudence.
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These arguments reinforce the centrality of customary law alongside common law, which not only guarantees its recognition but also its development in terms of the enjoyment of the benefits associated with the legal system in question. In addition, it is an affirmation of a legal system that may produce an egalitarian, non-sexist society that is available to all.
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It is also submitted that the concern over the specific reference to common law to the exclusion of customary law in subsection 3 does not mean that we should create another national legal system. Rather, there is a need to ensure the establishment of shared principles and values, whether through the customary or the common law value systems, in the establishment of a just society as envisaged in the preamble of the Constitution. This contention was earlier endorsed by Sachs J in S v The quest for the interdependence of constitutional values advances the importance of a balance in their interpretation. This balance, as argued by Sachs J, gives effect to South Africa's subscription to the brain crust of the mixed legal systems in relation to the manner in which these values should be applied in a culturally diverse society and their implications for cultural diversity and difference. 47 The failure to balance constitutional values, as evidenced by the exclusion of customary law from section 8(3), compromises an opportunity for the development of the values of the new democracy on an equal footing. 48 It also undermines Langa DCJ's argument that if the development of customary law were to be undertaken through the lens of common law, it would lead to the fossilisation and codification which resulted in its marginalisation in the past. This means that customary law will consequently be denied the opportunity to grow in its own right and adapt itself to changing circumstances.
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It is also reasonable to deduce that the application of the Bill of Rights as envisaged in section 8(3) for the development of common law to the exclusion of customary law is not consistent with the Constitution itself. This contention is drawn from section 39(2) of the Constitution which is in direct contrast to section 8(3), as the former states that:
when interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights, (authors' emphasis).
In the context of developing customary law within the framework of this provision, 
Conclusion
As argued in this paper, the simultaneous recognition of customary law and common law in the Constitution 59 is commendable. This paper argues that the implication of section 8(3) on the development of the values of the various legal systems in South
Africa negates a shared understanding in relation to the evolution of the principles of customary law vis-à-vis those of common law. This paper has not engaged with the shortcomings of the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court itself. Instead, the primary focus was on section 8(3), which is a source of the inequality of the mixed legal systems in South Africa. This means that the inequality is traced back to the Constitution itself, as evidenced by the argument in this paper.
Although the drafters of the Constitution are commended for the inclusion of customary law as a legitimate system alongside common law, 60 this recognition is a reflection of the survival of the values of the old apartheid system in the new constitutional dispensation, as the constitution indirectly entrenches a subordinate status for customary law.
In relation to the argument made in this paper, it is essential for the Constitutional Review Committee, after sixteen years of democracy, to urgently consider reviewing 58 Koyana 1997 Consultus 126.
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See Qhubu "Development of Restorative Justice". She acknowledges at 14 that it has been a long and a rocky road. 
